The aim of the paper is to prove the completeness theorem for probability models with nitely many valued measure.
Introduction
Probability logics introduced by H. J. Keisler are logics appropriate for the study of structures of the form (A, µ) arising in Probability Theory, where A is a rst order structure and µ is a probability measure on A. The reader can nd detailed presentations on the host of probability logics in [9] and the monograph [11] . The basic probability logic L AP is similar to the in nitary logic L A except that instead of the ordinary quanti ers ∀x and ∃x, the logic L AP possesses the probability quanti ers (Px > r).
In this paper using the ideas from [2, 5, 10] we introduce logic L n AP which is complete for Σ de nable theories with respect to the class of probability models with nitely many valued measure. Let us note that our work could be seen as the rst step towards the widening of application frame for probability logics since in applied mathematics one often deals with (very large but) nite phenomena.
L n

AP logic
The main result which enable us to prove the corresponding Completeness Theorem is the following theorem (see [2] ).
Theorem 2.1. Let F be a eld of subsets of a set Ω. Then µ is a nitely many valued probability measure on F if and only if there is a real number c > such that µ(A) > c whenever A ∈ F and µ(A) > .
The logic L n AP has all the axiom schemas and rules of inference of L AP (listed in [9, 11] ) as well as the following axiom of nitely many valued measure:
where Φn ∈ A and Φn = {φ : φ has n free variables}.
Completeness theorem will be proven by combining a consistency property argument, such as that of [9] or [6] , and a weak-middle-strong construction, such as that of [10] . We need two sorts of auxiliary structures.
De nition 2.2. (i)
A weak structure for L n AP is a structure (A, µn) n≥ such that each µn is a nitely additive probability measure on A n with each singleton measurable and the set φ a = { b :
(ii) A middle structure for L n AP is a weak structure (A, µn) such that the following is true: there is a c > such that for each formula
Using a consistency property similarly as in [6] or [9] we prove that Σ de nable theory of L 
Proof.
In order to prove that consistent Σ de nable theory T of K n AP has a middle model, we introduce language M with three sorts of variables, such as that of [10] : X, Y , Z, . . . variable for sets, x, y, z, . . . variable for urelements and r, s, t, . . . variables for reals from [ , ] . The predicates of M are ≤ for reals, En( x, X) for n ≥ and x = x , . . . , xn (with the canonical meaning x ∈ X) and µ(X, r) (with the meaning µ(X) = r). The constant symbols are set constant symbols Xφ, for each φ ∈ K n AP and r for each r ∈ [ , ] ∩ A. The functional symbols are + and · for reals.
Let S be the rst-order theory of M A which has the following list of formulas:
for each predicate R( c, x) ∈ A;
Axioms of measure (a) (∀X)(∃ r)µ(X, r);
(b) (∀X)(∀Y) (µ(X, r) ∧ µ(Y , s) ∧ ¬ n≥ (∃ x)(En( x, X) ∧ En( x, Y))) → → (∃Z) n≥ (∀ x)(En( x, Z) ↔ (En( x, X) ∨ En( x, Y))) ∧ µ(Z, r + s) ;
Axiom of nitely many valued measure
where µ(X) > r is the formula (∃s)(s > r ∧ µ(X, s)); where
The theory S is Σ de nable over A. To prove that S is consistent it is enough, by Barwise Compactness Theorem (see [1] ), to show that S ⊆ S, S ∈ A has a standard model. First, note that a weak structure (A, µn) for K n AP can be transformed into a standard structure by taking:
holds in the weak model (A, µn), where S ⊆ S , S ∈ A is the closure for the substitution of constant symbols from C and disjunction and (S )n = {φ ∈ S : φ has n free variables}, it follows that
where P = {{ a ∈ A n ; (A, µn) |= φ[ a, c]} : φ ∈ S }, is the standard model for S and S , too.
Lastly, note that a standard model B of S can be transformed into a middle model B of T by taking:
It follows from the Loeb-Hoover-Keisler construction (see [6, 9, 11] ) that the axiom of nitely many valued measures implies that (*) holds for all internal sets in the nonstandard superstructure. The property (*) also holds for all Loeb measurable sets because these can be approximated by internal ones. Thus, it follows from Theorem 2.1. that each middle model in which all theorems of L n AP hold is elementary equivalent to a probability model for L n AP . As a consequence of the preceding we obtain the following theorem. Finally, let us note that structure (A, µ), where µ is a nitely many valued probability measure, cannot be axiomatized so that extended completeness theorem holds. The following example of a countable consistent theory T in L n AP does not have a probability model with nitely many valued measure. Example. Let L = {R (x), R (x), . . .} be a ∆ de nable set which is not a subset of an element of A, and let φ , φ , . . . be an enumeration of all formulas from L n AP . Then there exists the rst predicate, denoted by Rφ n (x), not occurring in φ , . . . , φn; otherwise L ⊆ TC(φ ) ∪ . . . ∪ TC(φn) ∈ A, which would imply that L ∈ A as a ∆ de nable set.
It is obvious that the countable theory T = {(Pxy ≥ )x ≠ y} ∪ {(Px > )(Rφ (x) ∧ . . . ∧ Rφ n (x)) : n ∈ ω} ∪ {(Px < / n )Rφ n (x) : n ∈ ω} does not have any probability model with nitely many valued measure. We prove that T is consistent in L 
